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INTRODUCTION
Hardly a week goes by that I’m not presented with a proposed
parenting plan that separates siblings.
—Judge Anne Kass1
Family law is tightly focused on two relationships: the bond
between spouses and the bond between parent and child. The intense
and rarely wavering spotlight on marriage and parenthood is so
central to the law that it operates as a mostly unstated, yet canonical
premise. Scholars note that “the traditional categories of domesticrelations law” are “matrimony and parenthood” without questioning
this organizational structure or exploring its consequences.2 The


Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A. 1994, J.D. 1997, Yale
University. I would like to thank Allan Erbsen, Clare Huntington, and the participants in a
family law conference held at UC Hastings College of the Law for their comments. © 2012, Jill
Elaine Hasday.
1.
Anne Kass, Splitting Siblings upon Divorce, FAIRSHARE, Jan. 1998, at 13, 13.
2.
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA, at x (1985); see also infra Part II.
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assumption that family law should be riveted on marriage and
parenthood is widely accepted as a matter of simple common sense.
Yet family relationships beyond marriage and parenthood are
often crucial to family life. Family law’s narrow concentration on
marriage and parenthood comes at the expense of considering how the
law should regulate and protect other family ties.
Reflexive focus on only two family relationships diverts legal
scrutiny and support away from myriad family bonds and many kinds
of relatives, such as siblings, grandparents, grandchildren, aunts,
uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins.3 The effects are manifest
throughout the law regulating the rights and responsibilities
associated with family status. For instance, an undocumented
immigrant living in the United States and raising citizen children
may be able to avoid deportation if she is legally connected to the
children through parenthood. But she will not be able to avoid
deportation if she is legally connected to the children through any
other family relationship, no matter how much hardship her
deportation will inflict on the children.4 Likewise, eligible employees
have the right under federal law to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid
leave a year to care for a seriously ill spouse, child, or parent, but
federal law does not entitle workers to even one day of leave to care for
any other ill family member.5 Indeed, family law’s focus on marriage
and parenthood is so powerful that the law generally does not impose
financial support obligations on family members other than spouses,
parents, and adult children.6 Whatever one thinks about this as a
policy matter, the choice is notable in light of the state’s strong fiscal
incentives to compel family members to support their relatives so that
3.
See, e.g., Rohmiller v. Hart, 799 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (“Like statutory
law, Minnesota caselaw does not confer on courts the right to grant visitation to the sibling of a
deceased parent . . . .”); In re Katrina E., 636 N.Y.S.2d 53, 53 (App. Div. 1996) (“Family Court
correctly ruled that petitioners, the aunt and uncle of children whose care and custody has been
transferred to the Commissioner of Social Services, have no standing to sue for visitation. Absent
standing, the question of whether such visitation would be in the best interests of the children
cannot be considered.” (citations omitted)).
4.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2006); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Hector, 479
U.S. 85, 86, 88 (1986) (per curiam).
5.
See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 102, 107 Stat. 6, 9–11
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1), (c) (2006 & Supp. II 2009)); Novak v. MetroHealth
Med. Ctr., 503 F.3d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 2007); Krohn v. Forsting, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1092 (E.D.
Mo. 1998).
6.
A few states have enacted, although radically underenforced, laws requiring
grandparents, grandchildren, or siblings to provide financial support if the recipient relative is
needy and unable to support himself and the payer relative is able to provide support. See
ALASKA STAT. § 47.25.230 (2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4731 (2006); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
229 (2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-31-25 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-14-2 (LexisNexis 2009); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 9-5-9 (LexisNexis 2007).
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indigent people do not need to rely on government assistance. The
absence of support obligations placed on other relatives, in turn, may
help further reinforce family law’s interest in marriage and
parenthood, as the government often has less to gain economically
from protecting and maintaining other family ties.
Family law’s intense concentration on marriage and
parenthood has left little room for legal attention directed at any other
family relationship. The breadth of this exclusion from family law’s
canon is enormous. Examining the legal treatment of one
noncanonical family relationship, whose marginalization in family law
is particularly remarkable, can provide a foundation for better
understanding the consequences of family law’s narrowness.
The sibling relationship offers a striking illustration of a
crucial, yet legally neglected, family tie. Siblings can give each other
support, love, nurturing, and stability. But the law governing
children’s family relationships focuses almost exclusively on children’s
ties with their parents rather than children’s ties with their siblings,
making only modest, scattered, and unsystematic efforts to safeguard
sibling relationships when they are in jeopardy. Siblings who have
lived together for years are sometimes separated at adoption or
parental divorce or death with no right to contact each other,
communicate, or visit. Siblings who are separated early on may have
no opportunity and no right even to learn of each other’s existence.
Nonetheless, sibling relationships have received amazingly little
attention from courts, legislatures, and scholars. This Essay uses the
example of sibling relationships to explore family law’s treatment of
noncanonical family ties and to consider some of the reform
possibilities that emerge when we expand family law’s focus beyond
marriage and parenthood.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SIBLINGS
The sibling relationship is potentially one of life’s most
significant connections. Siblings can know and support each other
from their earliest years through their final ones. The relationship
between two siblings, which begins with the birth of the younger
sibling and can continue until a sibling dies, is often the longestlasting relationship that a person ever experiences.7 Most people have
7.
For an account of a particularly long-lasting and close sibling relationship, see SARAH
DELANY & A. ELIZABETH DELANY WITH AMY HILL HEARTH, HAVING OUR SAY: THE DELANY
SISTERS’ FIRST 100 YEARS 5 (1993) (“Bessie is my little sister, only she’s not so little. She is 101
years old, and I am 103. . . . Neither one of us ever married and we’ve lived together most all of
our lives, and probably know each other better than any two human beings on this Earth.”).

4b. Hasday_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

900

4/27/2012 12:35 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:3:897

a living sibling until the end or nearly the end of their lives and
remain in contact with their siblings throughout.8 A sibling
relationship can last for decades longer than the relationship between
a parent and child, which typically ends with the parent’s death when
the child still has many years left, or the relationship between
spouses, who usually do not meet until adulthood.
Strong bonds between siblings can develop remarkably early in
life. Many children spend more time with their siblings than with
anyone else, except (sometimes) a parent.9 Moreover, siblings provide
children with an opportunity to experience an intimate family
relationship that tends to be much more egalitarian than that between
parent and child,10 and that operates to at least some extent outside of
parental view.11 The emotional importance of the sibling relationship
can motivate even very small children to understand their siblings
extremely well. Children as young as sixteen to eighteen months can
comfort their siblings and empathize with them. Two- and three-yearolds can recognize and discuss their siblings’ abilities, emotions, plans,
and desires.12
Siblings who grow up together accumulate a store of shared
memories and experiences that can shape each sibling individually
and establish a foundation for their lifelong relationships with each
other.13 Indeed, sibling relationships can be so formative that they
8.
See JANE MERSKY LEDER, BROTHERS & SISTERS: HOW THEY SHAPE OUR LIVES, at xv,
102, 104 (1991); Victor G. Cicirelli, Sibling Influence Throughout the Lifespan, in SIBLING
RELATIONSHIPS: THEIR NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE ACROSS THE LIFESPAN 267, 281 (Michael E.
Lamb & Brian Sutton-Smith eds., 1982) [hereinafter Cicirelli, Sibling Influence]; Victor G.
Cicirelli, Sibling Relationships in Middle and Old Age, in SIBLING RELATIONSHIPS: THEIR
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 47, 50–51, 61 (Gene H. Brody ed., 1996) [hereinafter Cicirelli,
Sibling Relationships].
9.
See JUDY DUNN, SISTERS AND BROTHERS 4 (1985); LEDER, supra note 8, at xv; Don
Meyer, Foreword to PEGGY GALLAGHER ET AL., BROTHERS & SISTERS: A SPECIAL PART OF
EXCEPTIONAL FAMILIES, at ix, ix (3d ed. 2006).
10. See VICTOR G. CICIRELLI, SIBLING RELATIONSHIPS ACROSS THE LIFE SPAN 2 (1995);
ELIZABETH FISHEL, SISTERS: LOVE AND RIVALRY INSIDE THE FAMILY AND BEYOND 110, 115 (1979);
LEDER, supra note 8, at 3; Cicirelli, Sibling Influence, supra note 8, at 268; Michael E. Lamb,
Sibling Relationships Across the Lifespan: An Overview and Introduction, in SIBLING
RELATIONSHIPS: THEIR NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE ACROSS THE LIFESPAN, supra note 8, at 1, 6;
Laura M. Padilla-Walker et al., Self-Regulation as a Mediator Between Sibling Relationship
Quality and Early Adolescents’ Positive and Negative Outcomes, 24 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 419, 426
(2010).
11. See LEDER, supra note 8, at 63.
12. See DUNN, supra note 9, at 169–70.
13. See STEPHEN P. BANK & MICHAEL D. KAHN, THE SIBLING BOND, at xv–xvii (2d ed. 1997);
DUNN, supra note 9, at 162–63; FISHEL, supra note 10, at 113–15; GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note
9, at xi; LEDER, supra note 8, at xvi, 8, 104–05, 155; SUSAN SCARF MERRELL, THE ACCIDENTAL
BOND: THE POWER OF SIBLING RELATIONSHIPS 7–8, 13, 15–16, 142 (1995); Cicirelli, Sibling
Influence, supra note 8, at 268.

4b. Hasday_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2012]

4/27/2012 12:35 PM

SIBLINGS IN LAW

901

often create groundwork and patterns for other close relationships
that siblings develop, such as with a romantic partner, spouse, or
child.14
Sibling relationships can be especially important when other
family relationships falter, weaken, change, or end. Children with
absent, dysfunctional, or warring parents often forge extraordinarily
close and intense sibling bonds that provide the children with solace,
nurturing, caretaking, and secure emotional attachments.15 Adult
siblings commonly rely on each other for psychological and material
support when a parent becomes ill or dies, when a marriage ends, or
during other times of family crisis.16 Elderly siblings frequently
provide each other with comfort, security, companionship, belonging,
connectedness, and sometimes material help and caregiving.17 Many
elderly people report that they feel closer to their siblings than to any
other family members except their own children.18 Sibling
relationships can be particularly significant later in life when spouses
have died and children have left or become preoccupied with other
responsibilities.19
Elderly siblings who have not maintained affectionate
relationships with their brothers and sisters often identify this
absence as a source of tremendous regret and loss.20 Siblings are most
likely to develop and sustain strong bonds if they have early, close,

14. See CICIRELLI, supra note 10, at 114; LEDER, supra note 8, at xviii, 38, 62; THEODORE
LIDZ, THE PERSON: HIS AND HER DEVELOPMENT THROUGHOUT THE LIFE CYCLE 558 (rev. ed.
1983); MERRELL, supra note 13, at 11–12, 14–15.
15. See BANK & KAHN, supra note 13, at xvii, 19, 64, 112–13; DUNN, supra note 9, at 159–
60; FISHEL, supra note 10, at 109–10; GLORIA HOCHMAN ET AL., NAT’L ADOPTION INFO.
CLEARINGHOUSE, THE SIBLING BOND: ITS IMPORTANCE IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTIVE
PLACEMENT 3 (1992); LEDER, supra note 8, at 8, 213–15, 226–27; DOROTHY W. LE PERE ET AL.,
LARGE SIBLING GROUPS: ADOPTION EXPERIENCES 9 (1986); MERRELL, supra note 13, at 59–60,
273; Stephen Bank & Michael D. Kahn, Intense Sibling Loyalties, in SIBLING RELATIONSHIPS:
THEIR NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE ACROSS THE LIFESPAN, supra note 8, at 251, 251.
16. See CICIRELLI, supra note 10, at 109, 115; DUNN, supra note 9, at 159–60, 162–63;
FISHEL, supra note 10, at 98–99; LEDER, supra note 8, at xvi–xvii; Cicirelli, Sibling
Relationships, supra note 8, at 68.
17. See CICIRELLI, supra note 10, at 109, 115, 201; DUNN, supra note 9, at 162–63; LEDER,
supra note 8, at 104–05; Cicirelli, Sibling Relationships, supra note 8, at 51, 55, 68.
18. See LEDER, supra note 8, at 104–05; Cicirelli, Sibling Influence, supra note 8, at 274.
19. See BANK & KAHN, supra note 13, at 13; GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 9, at 16–17;
Cicirelli, Sibling Influence, supra note 8, at 274.
20. See BANK & KAHN, supra note 13, at xxiii.
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frequent, and extended contact in childhood.21 Closeness in sibling
relationships rarely originates in adulthood.22
II. SIBLINGS IGNORED
Despite the potential significance and value of sibling bonds,
legal interest in sibling relationships is radically underdeveloped. This
pattern of neglect began at common law and represents an important
example of the common law’s sustained influence on modern family
law.
Common law courts and scholars endlessly discussed, debated,
developed, and deployed the law of marriage and parenthood, while
addressing siblings rarely. In fact, common law treatises on the family
announced in their very titles that they covered “The Law of Baron
and Femme” or “Husband and Wife” and the law of “Parent and Child”
without mentioning sibling relationships or ties between other family
members.23 The common law recognized sibling relationships, but
infrequently considered siblings beyond a few legal contexts, such as
incest prohibitions barring siblings from sexual or marital
relationships with each other,24 or intestacy doctrine specifying the
circumstances under which a sibling could inherit when a person died
without a will.25
Legal consideration of siblings is still fragmentary. Family law
scholars have written little about sibling relationships, and the law’s
protection for sibling ties remains unsystematic and incomplete.26 To
21. See id. at 10; DUNN, supra note 9, at 158–59; LEDER, supra note 8, at xvii, 81; Cicirelli,
Sibling Influence, supra note 8, at 282–83.
22. See Helgola G. Ross & Joel I. Milgram, Important Variables in Adult Sibling
Relationships: A Qualitative Study, in SIBLING RELATIONSHIPS: THEIR NATURE AND
SIGNIFICANCE ACROSS THE LIFESPAN, supra note 8, at 225, 230.
23. TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME; OF PARENT AND CHILD; OF GUARDIAN
AND WARD; OF MASTER AND SERVANT (New Haven, Oliver Steele 1816); JAMES SCHOULER, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS; EMBRACING HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT
AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, INFANCY, AND MASTER AND SERVANT (Boston, Little, Brown, &
Co. 1870).
24. See SCHOULER, supra note 23, at 26–27.
25. See 2 EMORY WASHBURN, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 401–35
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1862).
26. For some of the scant legal scholarship to date that has focused on sibling relationships,
see Ellen Marrus, “Where Have You Been, Fran?”: The Right of Siblings to Seek Court Access to
Override Parental Denial of Visitation, 66 TENN. L. REV. 977, 977–78 (1999) (“[W]hen parents
decide to separate siblings or half-siblings and deny them all contact or visitation with each
other after divorce or the death of a common parent. . . . , I argue that siblings should have
standing to sue or should be given other opportunities to voice their wishes in a court before they
undergo a lasting separation.”); William Wesley Patton & Sara Latz, Severing Hansel from
Gretel: An Analysis of Siblings’ Association Rights, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 745, 784–85 (1994) (“It is
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the extent that legislatures have protected sibling relationships at all,
they tend to treat that protection more as a legislative gift bestowed at
the discretion of lawmakers than as a recognition of the legitimate
claims of siblings.
The legal treatment of sibling relationships between minor
children is particularly striking. Childhood is the crucial period for
forming and solidifying sibling bonds. Moreover, children are
systematically more vulnerable than adults to both government and
private action that harms them or simply ignores their interests,
which makes the availability of legal protection for children’s
relationships especially important. Yet family law envisions children
almost entirely in terms of their relationships with adults—their
parents—rather than in terms of their relationships with other
children—their siblings.
Consider how family law deals with sibling relationships
between children at moments when those relationships are most likely
to be threatened, such as when siblings are facing adoption, parental
divorce, or a parent’s death.27 Reviewing current law in some depth
uncovers some of the places where legislatures and courts confront key
choices about whether and how to protect sibling relationships, and
illustrates some of the ways in which existing law largely fails to
safeguard sibling bonds.
A. Adoption
Adoption can separate siblings and legally terminate their
relationship. Siblings separated by adoption have written and spoken
about the “pain,”28 “ ‘sad[ness],’ ”29 and “complete shock”30 that such a
time for the Court to declare . . . that siblings have a fundamental liberty interest in associating,
and that only after a procedurally fair due process hearing may the State separate siblings and
only then because it is the least drastic alternative in the children’s best interest.”); Barbara
Jones, Note, Do Siblings Possess Constitutional Rights?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1187, 1188 (1993)
(“This Note argues that siblings possess a fundamental constitutional right to maintain
relationships with each other. Additionally, this Note asserts that courts should recognize that
the right of siblings to associate with each other is equal to the right of parents to rear their
children. When the sibling’s rights and the parent’s rights collide, the constitutional arguments
should cancel each other out. Courts should instead consider the best interests of the children to
determine whether to permit visitation.”).
27. Parents in an intact marriage can also impose obstacles on sibling relationships. See In
re Interest of D.W., 542 N.W.2d 407, 409–10 (Neb. 1996); Weber v. Weber, 524 A.2d 498, 498 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1987).
28. Brenden Timpe, Family Sorrow, Family Miracle, GRAND FORKS HERALD, June 27, 2004,
at 1A (“[Dovie] Rumbaugh recalled pain at being separated from her siblings as a child. When
Herb was adopted, she said, she stood in a corner and cried all day. When Della left, she was told
they were just taking a vacation. ‘Two years later, I thought, ‘That’s an awful long vacation,’ ’ she
said.”).
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separation can inflict. One sixteen-year-old, whose brother was
adopted away in the early 1990s at the age of six,31 wrote three years
later that she thought of her brother “every day—so much that it
hurts. It hurts the most when his birthday passes. He’s getting older
without me.”32 She had no right to contact her brother, to visit him, or
to know where he lived. Her brother’s adoptive parents had never
responded to her request that they permit visits. Indeed, the adoptive
parents had changed her brother’s first and last name, and she did not
know either.33 Another woman, the oldest of four sisters separated for
adoption in 1989 when they were thirteen, eight, four, and three,
reported eleven years later that finding her sisters “ ‘was something I
dreamed of and cried myself to sleep over many nights.’ ”34 One of the
woman’s sisters said that after the separation “ ‘[e]very night I would
cry and pray; all I ever wanted was my sisters.’ ”35
Some people who were separated from their siblings by
adoption have spent decades attempting to locate their siblings again.
One man, unable to discover any information about his adopted away
sister, checked the personal ads in his city’s newspapers “ ‘[e]very day
for about 30 years’ ” in the hopes of discovering news of her.36 One
family “ ‘put ads to [their adopted away sister] in the newspaper, like
‘Happy 32nd birthday. Wish we knew who you were,’ ’ ” in the hope of
attracting their sister’s attention.37 A woman who finally found her
adopted away siblings after thirty-one years explained: “ ‘I was
determined to find my sister and brother because I remembered them
and I loved them. Because they’re my sister and brother.’ ”38 Another
woman, who searched for her adopted away sister for more than forty
29. Tom Droege, Putting the Pieces Together: East Tulsan Meets with Siblings for First
Time in 13 Years, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 13, 2000, at 4 East (“Her mother’s funeral in 1987 was
the last time East Tulsan Michelle Skelton, 28, saw her seven brothers and sisters. ‘I have
pictures of them waving from the car as they were leaving the funeral,’ Skelton said. ‘That was
the saddest thing in the world.’ ”).
30. Wunika Hicks, I Lost My Brother to Adoption, in THE HEART KNOWS SOMETHING
DIFFERENT: TEENAGE VOICES FROM THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM 30, 31 (Al Desetta ed., 1996).
31. See id. at 31, 33.
32. Id. at 32.
33. See id. at 31–32.
34. Kim Horner, Almost Complete: Three Sisters Reunite 11 Years After Separation—and
Wonder About a Fourth, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Aug. 28, 2000, at 17A (quoting Misty Hayner).
35. Id. (quoting April Hartline Norris).
36. Linnet Myers, 40 Years After Adoption, Sister Finds Her Family, CHI. TRIB., May 25,
1990, § 2, at 3 (quoting William Wimmer).
37. Michele Lesie, Seeking Their Past: Registry Helps Adoptees Find Origins, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Nov. 23, 1996, at 1-E (quoting Theresa Emerson).
38. Stephanie Simon, Years Apart, 14 Find They’re All in Family, CHI. TRIB., July 6, 1990, §
2, at 1 (quoting Linda Jones).
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years, recounted “that as the oldest sibling, she ha[d] always dreamed
of finding her sister.”39 A man who looked for his two adopted away
sisters for twenty years described life without his sisters as “ ‘like a
circle that wasn’t complete.’ ”40 One of his sisters reported after the
siblings were reunited that finding her brother “ ‘filled a hole in [her]
heart.’ ”41 The other sister explained “ ‘[t]hat missing piece of the
puzzle is gone now. Now, we’ve got our brother back.’ ”42
Even adopted children who do not know if they have biological
siblings express a strong desire to discover whether they have such
siblings, to meet their siblings, and to have an ongoing relationship
with them.43
People who learn in adulthood that they have a biological
sibling who was adopted by another family often begin extensive
searches for their brother or sister. They can spend hours or years
“searching the Internet and writing e-mails,” employing lawyers,44
“filling out forms and waivers,”45 or seeking the help of newspaper
publicity.46 Some siblings who manage to find one another for the first
time as adults develop close relationships, “exchang[ing] thousands of
e-mails,”47 “getting together about once a week,”48 “ ‘talk[ing] every
day,’ ”49 or “talk[ing] twice a day.”50

39. Kevan Goff-Parker, OKDHS Adoption Subsidy Employee Judy Ott Finds Long-Lost
Sister After More than 40 Years, OKLA. WOMAN, Sept. 2004, at 5, 5.
40. Elbert Starks III, Search Mends Shattered Family: Siblings Are Reunited in Wadsworth
Decades After Their Mother’s Tragic Death Tore Them Apart, AKRON BEACON J., Feb. 7, 2005, at
B1 (quoting Rick Panther).
41. Id. (quoting Deborah Conway).
42. Id. (quoting Wendy Miracle).
43. See Jerica M. Berge et al., Adolescent Sibling Narratives Regarding Contact in
Adoption, 9 ADOPTION Q. 81, 99 (2006).
44. Christopher Woytko, Family Finds Long-Lost Brother, READING EAGLE, Aug. 31, 2007,
at C2.
45. Christine Show, Finally, Reunited: Brother and Sister Separated as Children, Adopted
by Different Families, Find Each Other After Long Search, NEWSDAY (Long Island), July 29,
2006, at A5.
46. See Mick Walsh, Ohio Couple Looking for a Long-Lost Brother: May Have Been Adopted
by a Columbus Family More than 50 Years Ago, COLUMBUS LEDGER-ENQUIRER, July 22, 2006, at
A1.
47. ELYSE SCHEIN & PAULA BERNSTEIN, IDENTICAL STRANGERS: A MEMOIR OF TWINS
SEPARATED AND REUNITED, at vii (2007).
48. Valerie Schremp Hahn, 3 Sisters Separated by Adoption Are Reunited and Sharing
Lives, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 27, 2004, at N2.
49. Elizabeth Moore, Sisters Get Together, 4 Decades Later: Separated by Adoption, 2 Are
Reunited, STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), Nov. 17, 2002, at 27 (quoting Fran Joans).
50. Show, supra note 45, at A5.
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Adoption law historically did not create a “presumption” in
favor of keeping siblings together,51 much less impose an “affirmative
duty” on states to do so.52 If siblings were adopted into separate
families, moreover, the law considered their relationship severed and
made no provision for contact, visitation, or even the opportunity to
learn of a sibling’s existence. The operative premise was that
biological siblings were legally connected through their relationship
with a shared parent or parents. Once a child’s legal relationship with
her birth parents ended, siblings no longer had any legally recognized
tie to each other.
Although there has been some reform in recent years, adoption
law’s attempts to protect sibling relationships remain relatively
modest and sporadic. This Section starts with the law governing
whether siblings available for adoption are placed in the same
adoptive home and then turns to how the law treats siblings who are
separated by adoption.
Federal law and the law of some states display some concern
about placing siblings available for adoption together. For instance,
federal law conditions some federal funding on a state’s agreement to
make “reasonable efforts” “to place siblings removed from their home
in the same . . . adoptive placement, unless the State documents that
such a joint placement would be contrary to the safety or well-being of
any of the siblings.” However, federal law neither elaborates on what
“reasonable efforts” means nor specifies the documentation that states
must produce to separate siblings.53 Moreover, a United States
District Court has held that this law creates no privately enforceable
rights.54
The state statutes and regulations that have been promulgated
thus far vary markedly in their commitment to placing siblings with
the same adoptive parents. New York and Massachusetts are on the
more protective end of the spectrum, at least according to the text of
their rules. In New York, “[m]inor siblings or half-siblings who are
free for adoption must be placed together in a prospective adoptive
family home unless the [agency] determines” “after a careful
assessment” according to specified criteria “that such placement would
be detrimental to the best interests of one or more of the children.”55
51. Adoption of Hugo, 700 N.E.2d 516, 524 (Mass. 1998).
52. In re Gerald J., 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 569, 574 (Ct. App. 1991).
53. Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-351, § 206, 122 Stat. 3949, 3962 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(31)(A) (Supp. II 2009)).
54. See BK v. N.H. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 814 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64–71 (D.N.H.
2011).
55. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 421.2(e), 421.18(d)(3) (2008).
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Massachusetts provides that “[s]iblings shall be placed in the same . . .
adoptive home unless the [agency] documents a written explanation in
the children’s record as to why such placement is not in the best
interest of the children.”56
Some states are less rigorous in their attempts to place siblings
together at adoption. Arizona provides that the state “shall make
reasonable efforts to place” a child available for adoption “with the
child’s siblings,” “unless a court determines that . . . the placement . . .
would be contrary to the child’s or a sibling’s safety or well-being.”57
Missouri just provides that adoption agencies “shall make reasonable
efforts to place siblings together.”58
In addition, most state law on the placement of siblings for
adoption focuses exclusively on siblings who are available for adoption
at the same time. Few states address situations in which one or more
siblings have already been adopted and another sibling subsequently
becomes available for adoption. The statutes that do cover this
situation range widely in the protection they offer to sibling
relationships. Consider the law in West Virginia, Florida, and Illinois.
West Virginia and Florida provide that the state must notify a parent
who has adopted one sibling if another sibling becomes available for
adoption,59 while Illinois law provides that the state will “make a good
faith effort to” provide such notification.60 If the first sibling’s adoptive
parent would like to adopt the second sibling, West Virginia specifies
that the state may keep the siblings apart only by presenting a court
with “clear and convincing evidence” that the adoption would be
contrary to the best interests of one or both siblings.61 Somewhat less
protectively, Florida provides that an adoption application from the
first sibling’s adoptive parent “will be given the same consideration as
an application for adoption by a relative.”62 Less protectively still,
Illinois law creates no preference in favor of the first sibling’s adoptive
parent, but instead instructs the state Department of Children and
Family Services to consider at least eight factors in deciding who

56. 102 MASS. CODE REGS. 5.08(10) (1998).
57. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-513(D) (Supp. 2010).
58. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 13, § 40-73.080(5)(C) (1998).
59. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65C-16.002(4)(e) (2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-2-14(d)
(LexisNexis 2009).
60. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/7.4(a) (West 2008).
61. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-2-14(e). For a case enforcing this statute, see In re Carol B., 550
S.E.2d 636, 644–45 (W. Va. 2001).
62. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65C-16.002(4)(e).
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should adopt the second sibling, one of which is “the family ties
between the child and the child’s relatives, including siblings.”63
When siblings are adopted into separate families, many states
continue to treat the sibling relationship as terminated. The law’s
focus remains on the connection between parent and child. For
instance, an Illinois appellate court has explained that “[o]nce an
unrelated adoption takes place, the child’s previous ties are completely
severed. For all practical and legal purposes, the child’s biological
relationships end. The child becomes the legal child of the adoptive
parents. Decisions and control over the adopted child’s life are turned
over to the adoptive parents. In an unrelated adoption, there simply is
no authority for visitation with the child’s biological family.”64 The
West Virginia Supreme Court has reported that “[t]he right to sibling
visitation does not apply in adoption cases.”65 Virginia law provides
that except in adoptions by a new spouse of a birth or adoptive parent,
siblings “shall, by final order of adoption, be divested of all legal rights
and obligations in respect to the child including the right to petition
any court for visitation with the child.”66
With little apparent effect to date, federal law conditions some
federal funding on a state’s agreement to make “reasonable efforts”—a
term again left undefined—“to provide for frequent visitation or other
ongoing interaction between the siblings [separated by adoption],
unless that State documents that frequent visitation or other ongoing
interaction would be contrary to the safety or well-being of any of the
siblings.”67
Some state statutes mention visitation or communication
between siblings separated by adoption, but most of these laws impose
no requirements on adoptive parents and confer no rights on siblings.
One common pattern is for state laws that discuss postadoption
sibling contact to focus on advice and encouragement. For instance,
Iowa requires adoption agencies to “[e]ncourage prospective adoptive
parents to plan for facilitating postadoption contact between the child
and the child’s siblings.” Iowa also requires adoption agencies to
“[p]rovide prospective adoptive parents with information regarding
the child’s siblings” and “information regarding the importance of
63. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/7.4(b).
64. Harold K. v. Ryan B., 730 N.E.2d 88, 95 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (citation omitted); see also
In re M.M., 619 N.E.2d 702, 713 (Ill. 1993); Donte A. v. Charlene T., 631 N.E.2d 257, 263 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994).
65. Lindsie D.L. v. Richard W.S., 591 S.E.2d 308, 312 n.3 (W. Va. 2003).
66. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.2-1215, 63.2-1241 (2007).
67. Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-351, § 206, 122 Stat. 3949, 3962 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(31)(B) (Supp. II 2009)).
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sibling relationships to an adopted child.”68 California law does the
same,69 and case law in California makes clear that neither adoption
agencies nor courts in California have the authority to compel an
adoptive parent to permit visitation between siblings separated by
adoption.70 Colorado law similarly limits itself. It instructs courts to
“inquire as to whether the adoptive parents have received counseling
regarding children in sibling groups maintaining or developing ties
with each other” and states that “if the adoptive parents are willing,
the court may encourage reasonable visitation among the siblings
when visitation is in the best interests of the child or the children.”71
Maine law provides that the state “shall make reasonable efforts to
establish agreements with prospective adoptive parents that provide
for reasonable contact between an adoptive child and the child’s
siblings when the [state] believes that the contact will be in the
children’s best interests.”72 Washington instructs courts reviewing and
approving agreements to adopt a child from foster care to “encourage
the adoptive parents, birth parents, foster parents, kinship caregivers,
and the department [of social and health services] or other supervising
agency to seriously consider the long-term benefits to the child
adoptee and siblings of the child adoptee of providing for and
facilitating continuing postadoption contact between siblings.”73
Other state laws permit courts to issue orders providing for
postadoption sibling contact, but only if adoptive parents agree. For
example, Indiana authorizes courts issuing adoption decrees to order
“specific postadoption contact for an adopted child who is at least two
(2) years of age with a pre-adoptive sibling,” but only if “each adoptive
parent consents to the court’s order for postadoption contact
privileges” and “the court determines that the postadoption contact
would serve the best interests of the adopted child.”74 Louisiana law
similarly provides that courts may approve agreements that adoptive
parents have made for postadoption sibling contact if “[t]he child has
an established, significant relationship with [the child’s sibling] to the
extent that its loss would cause substantial harm to the child” and
“[t]he preservation of the relationship would otherwise be in the best

68. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.108(6) (West Supp. 2010).
69. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16002(e) (West Supp. 2010).
70. See In re Celine R., 71 P.3d 787, 794 (Cal. 2003); In re Daniel H., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 475,
481 (Ct. App. 2002).
71. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-210(7) (2009).
72. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4068(2) (Supp. 2009).
73. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.430 (West Supp. 2010); see also id. § 26.33.190(2)(c).
74. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16.5-1 (LexisNexis 2007); see also id. § 31-19-16.5-4.
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interest of the child.”75 Tennessee law explicitly states that “[t]he
adoptive parents of a child shall not be required by any order of the
adoption court to permit visitation by any other person.” Adoptive
parents in Tennessee may, “in their sole discretion,” decide to allow
sibling visitation or other sibling contact, but even if adoptive parents
agree “to permit visitation or contact” their agreement does not give
siblings “any enforceable rights.”76
Only a few states permit courts to order postadoption sibling
contact over an adoptive parent’s objection. Florida law authorizes
courts to order postadoption sibling communication or contact for a
child adopted from the custody of the state “[i]f the court determines
that the child’s best interests will be served by postadoption
communication or contact.” “Statements of the prospective adoptive
parents” are one factor courts must consider in deciding whether to
order postadoption sibling communication or contact, but not the only
factor.77 However, an adoptive parent in Florida may petition at any
time for review of a sibling communication or contact order, and a
court may terminate or modify the order if the court determines that
doing so is in the adopted child’s best interests.78 Nevada authorizes
courts in adoption proceedings to grant siblings “a reasonable right to
visit” the adopted child if a court previously gave the siblings “a
reasonable right to visit the child” when her parent died, divorced,
separated, or lost or relinquished parental rights.79 Arkansas law
provides that “[s]ibling visitation shall not terminate if the adopted
child was in the custody of the Department of Human Services and
had a sibling who was not adopted by the same family and before
adoption the circuit court in the juvenile dependency-neglect or
families-in-need-of-services case has determined that it is in the best
interests of the siblings to visit and has ordered visitation between the
siblings to occur after the adoption.”80
In addition, a few states give siblings themselves the right to
seek postadoption contact with each other. For example,
Massachusetts permits “[a]ny child over 12 years of age [to] request
visitation with siblings who . . . have been adopted in a foster or
75. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1269.2(A) (Supp. 2010).
76. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-121(f) (2005); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-35(A) (West
Supp. 2009); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 112-b(2) (McKinney 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.33.295(2) (West Supp. 2010).
77. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0427(1) (West 2005).
78. See id. § 63.0427(2).
79. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.171(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); id. § 125C.050(1), (7)
(2004).
80. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-215(c) (Supp. 2011).
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adoptive home other than where the child resides.”81 When a child is
being adopted by a stepparent, Vermont permits the child’s sibling to
request postadoption visitation or communication. Vermont authorizes
courts to grant the request if it is in the adopted child’s best interests,
taking into account “any objections to the requested order by the
adoptive stepparent and the stepparent’s spouse.”82 A sibling in New
Jersey may petition for postadoption visitation and receive it if she
can prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that visitation is
necessary to avoid harm to the” brother or sister who has been
adopted away from her.83 Maryland law provides that “[a]ny siblings
who are separated due to a[n] . . . adoptive placement may petition a
court, including a juvenile court with jurisdiction over one or more of
the siblings, for reasonable sibling visitation rights.” Maryland
instructs a court considering such a petition to “weigh the relative
interests of each child and base its decision on the best interests of the
children promoting the greatest welfare and least harm to the
children.”84
Even where they do exist, however, laws authorizing siblings to
seek postadoption contact and laws empowering courts to order such
contact over an adoptive parent’s objection may be unconstitutional
under the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Troxel v. Granville.85
The Troxel plurality held that a Washington state statute authorizing
courts to “ ‘order visitation rights for any person when visitation may
serve the best interest of the child’ ”86 was unconstitutional as applied
where a Washington Superior Court had granted a nonparent
visitation petition under the statute without according “any material
weight” to the mother’s determination of her children’s best
interests.87 The Superior Court had given two paternal grandparents
the right to visit with their granddaughters for one weekend per
month, one week in the summer, and four hours on each
grandparent’s birthday. This was less visitation than the
grandparents had sought after their son’s death, but more than the
one short visit per month plus some holidays that the children’s

81. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 26B(b) (LexisNexis 2009). For decisions implementing this
provision, see Adoption of Pierce, 790 N.E.2d 680, 685 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003); Adoption of Galvin,
773 N.E.2d 1007, 1009 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
82. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 4-112(c)–(d) (2002).
83. In re D.C., 4 A.3d 1004, 1021 (N.J. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
84. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-525.2(b) (LexisNexis 2006).
85. 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
86. Id. at 61 (citation omitted).
87. Id. at 72.
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mother wanted to allow.88 The Troxel plurality concluded that
awarding the grandparents visitation based simply on the children’s
best interests “was an unconstitutional infringement on [the mother’s]
fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of her two daughters.”89
As Troxel illustrates, the Court’s current constitutional
jurisprudence on children’s family ties focuses tightly on the parentchild relationship, exemplifying and helping to perpetuate family law’s
reflexive privileging of marriage and parenthood. This narrow focus,
adopted with scant consideration of alternatives, is misguided in my
view. The Court’s constitutional decisionmaking could benefit
enormously from a much more systematic exploration of the value of
noncanonical family relationships.90 But as the Court’s case law is now
organized, laws authorizing postadoption sibling contact without an
adoptive parent’s agreement may unconstitutionally infringe on the
strong vision of parental autonomy that Troxel endorsed, unless
perhaps courts interpret these laws to mean that judges deciding
whether to authorize postadoption sibling contact over an adoptive
parent’s objection must give substantial weight to the parent’s
judgment about what is in his child’s best interests.
B. Parental Divorce or Death
Let’s turn to divorce. Siblings whose parents divorce are still
legally recognized as siblings. But parental divorce can leave siblings
in separate households and threaten the maintenance of functioning
ties between siblings, at a time when children often have more need
than ever for support and stability in their sibling relationships.91
Some siblings who were separated after their parents’ divorce
have described the hurt and loss that they experienced. One woman
recounted her separation from her brother this way: “ ‘When I was
little . . . my mom and dad had a divorce and my brother and I were
split. The father took him and my mother took me. It’s hard at 5 years
old to be playing with your brother all this time and all of a sudden
88. See id. at 60–61, 71.
89. Id. at 72.
90. For a rare counterexample to the Court’s narrow focus on marriage and parenthood, see
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“Ours is by no means
a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The
tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with
parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional
recognition.”).
91. See Lori Kaplan et al., Splitting Custody of Children Between Parents: Impact on the
Sibling System, 74 FAMILIES SOC’Y: J. CONTEMP. HUM. SERVICES 131, 133 (1993).
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he’s gone and you can’t see him and talk to him.’ ”92 Another woman
wrote that she “was left with a broken heart” after her divorcing
parents separated their children, with the father getting custody of
her and the mother getting custody of her sister and brother.93 A third
woman’s parents separated when she was an infant. Her mother took
her, and her father took her sister. When she learned of her sister’s
existence five years later, she “recall[ed] feeling a combination of
anger, hurt, frustration, and powerlessness in being denied a sibling
relationship for so long.”94
Divorce courts in every state will sometimes split custody of
siblings between parents so that some siblings live with one parent
and other siblings live with the second parent. One study of contested
custody cases found that courts awarded split custody 3.1% of the time
when the mother requested sole physical custody and the father
requested joint physical custody, that courts awarded split custody
7.5% of the time when each parent requested sole physical custody,
and that courts awarded split custody 14.2% of the time when the
mother requested joint physical custody and the father requested sole
physical custody.95 Another study of child custody awards found that
“[s]plit custody was awarded in 13 percent of the disputed cases but in
only 4 percent of the couples without a formal dispute.”96 The same
study found that split custody “occurred in about 5 percent of the cases
[overall] and this percentage did not change significantly from 1970 to
1993.”97
Sometimes courts ordering split custody are attempting to
resolve custody disputes between two parents who each want custody
of all their children. Sometimes courts accept split custody plans that
one parent has advocated or that both parents support and perhaps
have already implemented upon separating. Split custody can appeal
to a parent as a way of distributing the financial burdens and
psychological benefits of childrearing. Alternatively or in addition,
split custody can appeal to a parent who feels closer ties to some of his
children rather than others. For instance, split custody often operates
along sex-based lines, with mothers receiving custody of girls and
92. Larry Powell, Long-Overdue Reunion Is a Good Reason To Give Thanks, DALL.
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 24, 1988, at 38A (quoting Janie Owens).
93. Debra Nisson, Sisters Reunited After 23 Years, HOUS. CHRON., June 26, 1994, at 1G.
94. Marrus, supra note 26, at 978.
95. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND
LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 104 tbl.5.4 (1992).
96. Stephen J. Bahr et al., Trends in Child Custody Awards: Has the Removal of Maternal
Preference Made a Difference?, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 257 (1994).
97. Id. at 259.
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fathers receiving custody of boys.98 A family court judge in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, reported that “[h]ardly a week goes by that
[she is] not presented with a proposed parenting plan that separates
siblings.” The judge recounted one case that “involved a dad who
insisted on taking the younger of his two sons—the one who looked
just like dad. The boys were 18 months apart in age. Within a year of
separation, the older boy had become a ‘failure-to-thrive’ child.”99 In
each of these scenarios, courts and/or parents sometimes envision split
custody as a way of promoting strong relationships between parents
and the children left in their custody, even as this arrangement may
harm or disregard sibling ties.
Some courts appear to impose no presumptions against split
custody at divorce. They split the custody of siblings when that is
“desirable,”100 “reasonable,”101 or “best,”102 or they treat the separation
of siblings as just one factor among many for a court to take into
account in determining custody.103 Some state statutes similarly
include a child’s relationship with siblings as one factor for courts to
consider in deciding custody.104
Other courts have announced varying presumptions against
split custody, requiring what they deem to be “exceptional”

98. For examples of cases upholding split custody along sex-based lines, see Hepburn v.
Hepburn, 659 So. 2d 653, 654–55 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995); Matias v. Matias, 948 So. 2d 1021, 1022–
23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); In re Marriage of Pundt, 547 N.W.2d 243, 244–46 (Iowa Ct. App.
1996); In re Marriage of Williams, 90 P.3d 365, 366–67 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004); Durbin v. Durbin,
226 S.W.3d 876, 880–81 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam); Replogle v. Replogle, 903 S.W.2d 551,
554–56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Lightbody v. Lightbody, 840 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132–33 (App. Div. 2007);
Harris v. Harris, 647 A.2d 309, 314 (Vt. 1994); Gooch v. Gooch, 575 S.E.2d 628, 632 (W. Va. 2002)
(per curiam).
99. Kass, supra note 1, at 13.
100. BeauLac v. BeauLac, 649 N.W.2d 210, 216 (N.D. 2002).
101. In re Paternity of B.D.D., 779 N.E.2d 9, 14–15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
102. Puddicombe v. Dreka, 167 P.3d 73, 78 (Alaska 2007) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
103. See A.B. v. J.B., 40 So. 3d 723, 729–30 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (per curiam); Foskett v.
Foskett, 634 N.W.2d 363, 369 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); Price v. McBeath, 989 So. 2d 444, 459 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2008); Kay v. Ludwig, 686 N.W.2d 619, 630–31 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004); Gardner v.
Gardner, 229 S.W.3d 747, 754 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007); Harris, 647 A.2d at 313–14; Hughes v.
Gentry, 443 S.E.2d 448, 451–52 (Va. Ct. App. 1994); Blakely v. Blakely, 218 P.3d 253, 256 (Wyo.
2009).
104. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(A)(3) (Supp. 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10124(1.5)(a)(III) (2011); D.C. CODE § 16-914(a)(3)(C) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
32-717(1)(c) (Supp. 2011); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-14-13-2(4)(B), 31-17-2-8(4)(B) (LexisNexis 2007);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2010); MINN. STAT. § 518.17(1)(a)(5) (2010); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 452.375(2)(3) (West Supp. 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 2002); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-4-9(A)(3) (West 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(4) (Supp. 2011).
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circumstances,105 “overwhelming”106 or “strong need,”107 or
“compelling”108 or “overriding reasons.”109 But courts apply these
declared standards with virtually unfettered discretion, remarkable
inconsistency, and frequently questionable logic.
A presumption against split custody that sounds strict in
theory often means much less in practice. For instance, Kansas is a
rare state with a statute addressing split custody. The law provides
that “[i]n an exceptional case, the court may order a residential
arrangement in which one or more children reside with each parent
and have parenting time with the other.”110 However, the Kansas
Court of Appeals has interpreted this statutory language in a manner
that appears to eliminate any actual requirement of exceptional
circumstances, holding that “when the district court makes a finding,
supported by substantial competent evidence, that divided custody is
in a child’s best interests, the court has met the requirement of
establishing an ‘exceptional case.’ ”111
Similarly, the arguments that some parents advance for split
custody arrangements along sex-based lines, and that some courts
endorse, reflect deeply gendered understandings about what skills are
important for children and even about which children are most
valuable to parents. These arguments are typically presented and
sometimes accepted with little scrutiny or reflection about the sex
roles and sex-based hierarchy that they assume, enforce, and
perpetuate. One Vermont family court ordering split custody on sexbased lines “suggested that [the son] had a natural affinity for his
father, who teaches him ‘things a young boy should know,’ ” including
“fishing, hunting, and softball.”112 The Vermont Supreme Court
affirmed the split custody order on appeal, insisting that the family
court had not violated a Vermont statute prohibiting courts from

105. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-3207(b) (Supp. 2011); In re Marriage of Williams, 90 P.3d 365, 370
(Kan. Ct. App. 2004); Lloyd v. Butts, 37 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Ark. 2001); Sykes v. Warren, 258
S.W.3d 788, 793 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007); Durbin v. Durbin, 226 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)
(per curiam) (“ ‘exceptional or unusual circumstances’ ” (citation omitted)).
106. Valenti v. Valenti, 869 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 (App. Div. 2008).
107. Sanders v. Sanders, 923 So. 2d 721, 725 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
108. In re Marriage of Williams, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 923, 924 (Ct. App. 2001); Matias v. Matias,
948 So. 2d 1021, 1022–23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); In re Marriage of Pundt, 547 N.W.2d 243,
245 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); Brawley v. Brawley, 734 So. 2d 237, 241 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Saintz
v. Rinker, 902 A.2d 509, 513 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); Hathaway v. Bergheim, 648 N.W.2d 349, 352
(S.D. 2002).
109. In re Marriage of Morales, 159 P.3d 1183, 1189 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
110. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-3207(b).
111. In re Marriage of Williams, 90 P.3d 365, 370 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).
112. Harris v. Harris, 647 A.2d 309, 314, 312 (Vt. 1994).

4b. Hasday_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

916

4/27/2012 12:35 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:3:897

“ ‘apply[ing] a preference for one parent over the other because of the
sex of the child [or] the sex of a parent.’ ”113 An Iowa father who sought
custody of his son, but not his two daughters, explained that he and
his son “had similar interests, such as watching sports and playing
basketball.” The father singled out his son as “his best friend.” The
mother, who sought custody of all three children, testified that the
father “was polarizing the family along gender lines” by “favor[ing]”
their son and “not exhibit[ing] much interest in the girls. She felt that
while in [the father’s] care, [the son] began to exhibit more of a
disparaging attitude towards the girls. She testified the girls missed
[their brother], and she felt it would be better not to separate the
children.”114 The Iowa Court of Appeals announced that “[g]ood and
compelling reasons must exist” for splitting custody,115 yet ordered
split custody in this case nonetheless.116
Half-siblings are especially likely to be separated at divorce or
when their shared parent dies.117 Half-siblings who grow up together
can develop extremely close relationships. They often do not
distinguish between full and half-siblings, thinking about each other
just as sisters and brothers. In contrast, half-siblings with little
contact in childhood tend to have more distant relationships in
adulthood and to think about each other in ways that emphasize their
different histories rather than their shared ties.118
Custody law frequently adds obstacles to the development of
close ties between half-siblings. While some courts considering split
custody extend the same protections to full and half-sibling
relationships,119 many courts refuse to apply their presumptions
against splitting custody of full siblings to cases involving halfsiblings. These latter decisions treating half-siblings differently
113. Id. at 314 (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(c)).
114. In re Marriage of Pundt, 547 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).
115. Id. at 245.
116. See id. at 246.
117. For examples of half-siblings separated after the death of their shared parent, see
J.M.W. v. C.C., 736 So. 2d 644, 645 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999); Lihs v. Lihs, 504 N.W.2d 890, 891
(Iowa 1993); Jones v. Willis, 996 So. 2d 364, 372 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Mills v. Hardy, 842 So. 2d
443, 444–45, 453 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Scruggs v. Saterfiel, 693 So. 2d 924, 925 (Miss. 1997); D.N.
v. V.B., 814 A.2d 750, 751–52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
118. See LAWRENCE H. GANONG & MARILYN COLEMAN, REMARRIED FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
104 (1994); Lawrence H. Ganong & Marilyn Coleman, Do Mutual Children Cement Bonds in
Stepfamilies?, 50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 687, 696 (1988).
119. See A.B. v. J.B., 40 So. 3d 723, 729–30 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (per curiam); In re Marriage
of Quirk-Edwards, 509 N.W.2d 476, 480 (Iowa 1993); In re Marriage of Swenka, 576 N.W.2d 615,
618 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998); Sumrall v. Sumrall, 970 So. 2d 254, 259 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007); Saintz
v. Rinker, 902 A.2d 509, 513 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); Van Driel v. Van Driel, 525 N.W.2d 37, 40
(S.D. 1994); In re Guardianship of BJO, 165 P.3d 442, 446 (Wyo. 2007).
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sometimes seem to assume that half-sibling relationships are
necessarily less close or significant than full sibling relationships.120
More explicitly, courts refusing to create presumptions against
splitting half-siblings prioritize fairness between parents over the
promotion of sibling relationships. These courts note that a
presumption against separating half-siblings would favor the custody
claims of the half-siblings’ common parent, insist that this “ironclad
advantage”121 “would be blatantly unfair to”122 the other parent or
parents involved in a custody dispute, and swiftly assume that equity
between parents disputing custody takes precedence over fostering
relationships between half-siblings subject to such disputes.
When half-siblings are separated into the homes of different
parents, the half-siblings often have no right to visit each other over a
parent’s objection. State visitation statutes frequently provide no help
to siblings. By 2000, every state had enacted laws providing for some
type of grandparent visitation.123 But the passage of grandparent
visitation statutes appears to have been driven less by a broad
commitment to expanding family law’s focus beyond marriage and
parenthood, and more by the extraordinary lobbying efforts and
political power of groups promoting the interests of older Americans,
such as the AARP. Thomas Downey, a member of Congress who
advocated for grandparent visitation rights, noted candidly in 1991
the “well-known fact that seniors are the most active lobby in this
country, and when it comes to grandparents there is no one group
more united in their purpose.”124 Congress designated 1995 “the ‘Year
of the Grandparent.’ ”125 Siblings do not come close to garnering this
level of political support. Many states limit their nonparent visitation
laws to grandparents and do not permit other relatives, such as
siblings, to seek visitation. Even within these nonparent visitation
statutes, the premise that family law revolves around marriage and
parenthood remains powerful.

120. See Middleton v. Middleton, 113 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003); Miers v. Miers,
53 S.W.3d 592, 598 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Chant v. Filippelli, 716 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159–60 (App. Div.
2000); Stoppler v. Stoppler, 633 N.W.2d 142, 147 (N.D. 2001); In re K.L.R., 162 S.W.3d 291, 306
(Tex. Ct. App. 2005).
121. Viamonte v. Viamonte, 748 A.2d 493, 498 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
122. Johns v. Cioci, 865 A.2d 931, 943 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
123. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 n.* (2000) (plurality opinion) (citing statutes).
124. Grandparents Rights: Preserving Generational Bonds: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Human Servs. of the H. Select Comm. on Aging, 102d Cong. 2 (1991) (statement of Rep. Thomas
Downey).
125. Joint Resolution Designating 1995 the “Year of the Grandparent,” Pub. L. No. 103-368,
108 Stat. 3475, 3475 (1994).
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Several suits seeking visitation with a half-sibling in another
parent’s home have failed because the state provided no sibling
visitation statute. Court decisions rejecting these suits discount
sibling relationships to prioritize “parental authority,”126 “[a] parent’s
right to associate with and make decisions concerning the care,
custody and control of his or her children,”127 “the right of parents to
raise their children as they see fit.”128 The courts start from the
premise that parents have a right to exclude nonparents, including
siblings, from visitation with a child and refuse to disturb that
premise without statutory authorization.129
Some half-siblings have been unable to secure rights to visit
each other even in states with sibling visitation statutes.130
Legislatures often strictly limit these laws in the interest of
minimizing any infringement on “parental authority.”131 One halfsibling lost a visitation suit because the state statute (since repealed
entirely) authorized sibling visitation over a parent’s objection only if
at least one of the siblings at issue had a deceased parent.132 Another
half-sibling lost a visitation suit because the state statute authorized
sibling visitation over a parent’s objection only in cases where the
sibling whose visitation was sought either had a deceased parent or
had parents who were divorced or living separately.133 A third halfsibling lost a visitation suit because the state statute authorized
sibling visitation over a parent’s objection only if both siblings were
126. Lihs v. Lihs, 504 N.W.2d 890, 892 (Iowa 1993).
127. MBB v. ERW, 100 P.3d 415, 420 (Wyo. 2004).
128. Ken R. ex rel. C.R. v. Arthur Z., 682 A.2d 1267, 1271 (Pa. 1996).
129. See Sandor v. Sandor, 444 So. 2d 1029, 1030 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (per curiam);
Lihs, 504 N.W.2d at 892–93; Scruggs v. Saterfiel, 693 So. 2d 924, 926 (Miss. 1997); Ken R. ex rel.
C.R., 682 A.2d at 1271; D.N. v. V.B., 814 A.2d 750, 753–54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); MBB, 100 P.3d
at 420.
130. For examples of sibling visitation statutes, see ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060(a) (2010); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-13-102 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(a)(7) (Supp. 2011); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/607 (West Supp. 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344(C)–(D) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 125C.050(1) (LexisNexis 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:19-d (LexisNexis 2010); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 71 (McKinney 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119 (West Supp. 2010); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 15-5-24.3(b), 15-5-24.4 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-3-530(A)(44) (2010).
131. Pullman v. Pullman, 560 A.2d 1276, 1278 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988).
132. See Barger ex rel. E.B. v. Brown, 134 P.3d 905, 907 & n.1, 910 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006).
133. See Pullman, 560 A.2d at 1277–79 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1, found
unconstitutional as applied in Wilde v. Wilde, 775 A.2d 535, 538 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001)). Before New Jersey enacted a sibling visitation statute, an earlier decision from the New
Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, had held in a case involving full siblings separated by
a parent’s death because of subsequent conflict with the father’s new wife “that siblings possess
the natural, inherent and inalienable right to visit with each other,” “subject to the requirement
that such visitation be in the best interest of a minor child.” L. v. G., 497 A.2d 215, 216, 222 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
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dependent children already under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court.134
Moreover, even siblings who fall within a state visitation
statute may face constitutional obstacles in a legal regime that is
fixated on parent-child relationships and devotes little concern to
siblings. One half-sibling visitation suit failed because the court held
that it would be unconstitutional under the Troxel plurality’s vision of
“the fundamental liberty interest of a parent” to enforce the state’s
sibling visitation law against a parent who objected to visitation
between her child and the child’s half-sibling.135
In sum, the legal vulnerability of sibling relationships has
attracted insufficient attention from courts, legislators, and
commentators narrowly focused on marriage and parenthood. Yet
sibling relationships can be as significant as the parental and marital
bonds that are canonical in family law. A legal regime that fails to
safeguard sibling relationships can impose tremendous costs on people
who lose opportunities to develop and maintain bonds with their
siblings.
III. EXPANDING FAMILY LAW’S FOCUS BEYOND MARRIAGE AND
PARENTHOOD
Questioning family law’s reflexive focus on marriage and
parenthood helps direct our attention to the legal treatment of
noncanonical family members like siblings and encourages us to think
systematically about how best to reform the law’s regulation and
protection of sibling relationships. Lawmakers, judges, scholars,
advocates, and citizens should all participate in this process of
reexamining family law from the perspective of family ties beyond
marriage and parenthood. Thinking about how to protect and promote
noncanonical family relationships is as complicated and multifaceted,
and involves as many choices, tradeoffs, and decisions, as thinking
about how to protect and promote marital or parental relationships.
Even if everyone were to agree that noncanonical family ties merit
more legal support and safeguarding, difficult, complex, and
potentially divisive questions would still remain about how best to
accomplish this goal, in what ways, under what circumstances, and at
what costs. In the interest of sparking dialogue and debate, this Essay
concludes by exploring some potential policy reforms that come into

134. See In re Dependency of M.J.L., 96 P.3d 996, 1000 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
135. Herbst v. Swan, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836, 837, 841 (Ct. App. 2002).
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view when considering family law through the lens of sibling
relationships.
Let’s return to adoption, starting again with the issue of
whether siblings who are available for adoption at the same time are
placed in the same adoptive home. As this Essay has observed, current
law on sibling placement at adoption, where it exists, ranges widely
with little evidence of systematic deliberation or discussion. Less
protective states require adoption agencies to make “reasonable
efforts” to place siblings together. More protective states instruct
adoption agencies that they must place siblings together unless the
agency determines that a joint adoptive placement would be contrary
to at least one child’s best interests. Freed from the blinders of a tight
focus on marriage and parenthood, states can consider both of these
policies in more depth and with more care than they have shown to
date, and can also examine alternative policy choices.
For instance, states exploring or enacting a policy that would
require reasonable efforts from adoption agencies to place siblings
together could think more systematically about what constitutes
reasonable efforts. The appeal of a reasonable efforts standard is that
it seems designed to encourage joint placement of siblings, while
avoiding the imposition of too many costs on adoption agencies or the
addition of too much delay on adoptive placements. But the danger of
requiring only “reasonable efforts” is that such a requirement will
mean little in practice and will simply validate adoption agency
operations as they are, rather than pushing agencies to do more to
place siblings together. States seeking to capture the benefits of a
reasonable efforts standard, while minimizing the standard’s pitfalls,
might think about how to give greater guidance to adoption agencies
as the agencies look for “reasonable” ways to keep siblings together.
For example, statutes might provide that agency recruitment
materials publicizing children’s availability for adoption must picture
sibling groups together, stress that the agency is seeking joint
adoptive placements for siblings, and discuss the value of maintaining
sibling ties. This form of publicity should cost no more than publicity
that features children individually, and advertisements that depict
siblings together may themselves help facilitate joint adoptive
placements. The executive director of an adoption organization that
successfully employed this strategy has reported that “ ‘[m]ost people
are distressed when they hear there is a chance siblings will have to
be separated. It is against the natural order of things—and their
visceral reaction is that brothers and sisters should stay together.
Even a family considering the adoption of only one child will almost
always want to adopt his siblings once they are made aware of their
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existence.’ ”136 Another reform that states might implement without
imposing additional expense or delay would be to specify that adoption
agencies cannot (as they sometimes have)137 overlook or exclude a fit
prospective adoptive parent interested in adopting a sibling group
simply because the prospective parent is unmarried, gay, or already
has other children in his household. More aggressively, states might
also consider defining “reasonable efforts” to require adoption agencies
to conduct out-of-state searches for potential adoptive parents if
necessary to find a shared adoptive placement for a sibling group. This
strategy would impose costs on agencies and possibly delay some
adoptions, but it would have the considerable advantage of reaching a
much larger pool of potential adoptive parents.
Similarly, states instructing adoption agencies that they must
place siblings together unless the agency determines that a joint
adoptive placement would be contrary to at least one child’s best
interests could think more systematically about how to elaborate their
policies in ways that would promote and protect sibling relationships.
For instance, state law might seek to structure agency decisionmaking
about whether a joint adoptive placement would be against a sibling’s
best interests in an effort to ensure that agency practice reflects a real
commitment to keeping siblings together. State law might provide
that an adoption agency cannot conclude that a joint adoptive
placement would be against a sibling’s best interests without
documenting in writing all of the reasons for and against separating
the siblings. In addition, state law might provide that an agency
cannot decide against seeking a joint sibling placement unless at least
two different experts who have had sustained interaction with the
siblings agree with this assessment.
States committed to safeguarding sibling relationships in
adoption could also consider policies that would be more protective of
sibling ties than any of the laws enacted to date. For example, state
statutes could require adoption agencies to place siblings in the same
adoptive home when siblings are available for adoption at the same
time, unless the agency can present a court with a preponderance of
evidence (or even with clear and convincing evidence) that placing
siblings together would be contrary to at least one sibling’s best
interests. Such a standard would be more protective of sibling ties and
would give courts considerable leverage in monitoring agency

136. HOCHMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 7–8 (quoting Carolyn Johnson, National Adoption
Center).
137. See id. at 7; see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (Supp. 2009) (“Adoption by couples of
the same gender is prohibited.”).
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behavior. At the same time, subjecting adoption agencies to judicial
oversight in the interest of safeguarding sibling relationships would
likely demand important trade-offs by imposing additional expenses
on agencies and delaying the adoptive placement of some children.
States can additionally explore whether to apply the same
protective rules and standards to sibling adoptions regardless of
whether the siblings at issue have ever lived together.138 The reasons
to keep siblings together are most compelling when siblings have
already developed functioning relationships with each other. But
whether children have had the opportunity to live together is almost
always the product of adult decisions rather than children’s own
choices. States focused on protecting sibling relationships might
conclude that, even if siblings have not been able to live together to
date, the fact of their biological connection creates a unique foundation
for the development of lifelong intimacy and everyday functional ties
that the law should not surrender lightly. Indeed, we have seen that
adopted children report that they want these connections with their
biological siblings. Siblings separated by adoption often make great
efforts to find each other and develop ongoing relationships, even
when they have never lived together.139
Let’s turn to the situation of siblings who become available for
adoption after another sibling has already been adopted. Few states
have any statutes on this topic, but it is an important one that all
states should address. There are three basic issues for states to
consider: how to inform the adoptive parents of one sibling that
another sibling is available for adoption, how to encourage the first
sibling’s adoptive parents to seek adoption of the second sibling, and
how to treat the first sibling’s adoptive parents when they decide that
they would like to adopt the second sibling.
First, consider the notification of the first sibling’s adoptive
parents. States might explore strategies both to make notification
more effective in leading to the placement of siblings together and to
mitigate the costs associated with notification. For instance, one way
to make notification more effective might be to require state adoption
officials to contact the first sibling’s adoptive parents not only when a
second sibling becomes available for adoption, but also when a second
sibling enters the foster care system or experiences other changes
making it reasonably likely that the second sibling will become
138. For cases denying postadoption sibling visitation because the siblings never had the
opportunity to develop a relationship, see Sherman v. Hughes, 821 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (App. Div.
2006); In re Justin H., 626 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (App. Div. 1995); Hatch ex rel. Angela J v. Cortland
Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 605 N.Y.S.2d 428, 429 (App. Div. 1993).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 43–50.
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available for adoption. This practice would facilitate the prompt
placement of the second sibling in foster care with the parents who
have already adopted the first sibling. One way to make notification
less costly from the state’s perspective, while imposing only minimal
costs on adoptive parents, would be to require adoptive parents to
keep the contact information they provided to the state updated over
time. If the state cannot reach the first sibling’s adoptive parents with
the contact information that the parents provided, state law might
permit state adoption officials to access preexisting state databases on
driver’s licenses, voter registration, and the like, to facilitate finding
updated contact information.
Second, consider the provision of encouragement. A relatively
simple possibility for states to consider would be to require state
adoption officials to provide the first sibling’s adoptive parents with
information about the importance of sibling ties and to encourage
these parents to consider adopting the second sibling. States could do
even more to promote joint adoptive placements, albeit at significantly
greater expense, by establishing that any subsidies that are available
to an adoptive parent who adopts a sibling group all at once are also
available to an adoptive parent who has already adopted one sibling
and adopts another sibling later.140
Third, consider what happens when the first sibling’s adoptive
parents decide that they would like to adopt the second sibling as well.
The sparse state law on this subject currently ranges widely, from a
requirement that the state must place siblings together unless the
state can present a court with clear and convincing evidence that joint
adoption would be contrary to at least one sibling’s best interests, to a
policy providing that the sibling tie is just one of many factors that
state adoption officials will consider in placing the second sibling.
States need to focus on this issue, and to weigh the costs and benefits
of various alternatives. The advantages of placing siblings together
seem clear. Joint placement provides siblings with the best
opportunity to enhance or develop their connection with each other,
and to enjoy the potential lifelong significance and value of sibling
bonds. The costs of placing siblings together, in a situation where
there is a fit adoptive parent eager to raise the sibling group, are more
obscure and could usefully be elaborated before states decide against
adopting a standard that prioritizes joint sibling placement.

140. For an example of an adoption subsidy where “the child is the sibling or half-sibling of a
child already adopted and it is considered necessary that such children be placed together,” see
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.24(a)(3)(iii)(b) (2008).
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The next issue that states need to explore is how to treat
siblings who are separated by adoption. Here again, a range of options
emerges when family law focuses on sibling relationships. At the more
modest end of the spectrum, states could mandate that adoption
agencies educate adoptive parents about the importance of sibling ties
and encourage adoptive parents to permit and facilitate contact,
communication, and visitation between siblings. State law could direct
adoption agencies to work individually with adoptive parents to help
parents establish a schedule and routine of sibling visitation, phone
calls, e-mails, and the like. Adoption agencies could also help parents
anticipate and respond to logistical difficulties, such as those created
when siblings live a considerable distance apart.
A significantly more demanding approach to protecting sibling
relationships would be to give siblings separated by adoption an
enforceable right to contact, communication, and visitation even over a
parent’s objection, unless a court determines that such contact would
be contrary to the best interests of one or more siblings. The argument
in favor of such a policy is that enforceable postadoption sibling rights
are worth their intrusion on parental autonomy because sibling
relationships are potentially as important and valuable as parentchild relationships. However, legislatures may be unwilling to limit
parental prerogatives in this way and courts may be even less willing
to uphold such a limit. Surviving a constitutional challenge under
Troxel may require postadoption sibling visitation statutes to specify
that courts must give “material weight” (or perhaps something more
than that) to a parent’s assessment of her child’s best interests.141 This
is a large limitation, but perhaps an unavoidable one absent
substantial reform of the Supreme Court’s constitutional regime
prioritizing parental autonomy.
Another policy possibility for states to consider in more detail
concerns whether and how to use sibling registries to enable siblings
separated by adoption to contact each other when they reach the age
of majority. These registries are not a substitute for contact in
childhood, the most crucial period for forming sibling ties. But they
represent a much smaller infringement on the autonomy of adoptive
parents and thus may be more politically and judicially acceptable.
At least thirty-six states currently have some form of sibling
registry for adopted children and their siblings.142 However, states
could think about a variety of potential reforms in the interest of
protecting sibling ties. First, many states collect information about a
141. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000) (plurality opinion).
142. See statutes cited infra notes 144, 147.
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child’s biological family, including siblings, as the biological family
exists at the moment of the child’s adoption, but devote little, if any,
attention to keeping that information current.143 States could explore
whether and how to implement procedures for updating an adopted
child’s biographical information when another biological sibling is
born or identified. States could also consider requiring adoptive
parents to keep the contact information for their adopted children
current at least until the children turn eighteen.
Second, states could think about revising their procedures for
distributing the information they collect. For instance, more states
could enact “confidential intermediary” sibling registries that help
willing brothers and sisters find each other, even if one sibling is
unaware of the registry. Some state sibling registries now operate just
as passive “mutual consent” registries that connect two siblings
separated by adoption only if both have discovered the registry and
requested contact information for each other.144 These passive
registries tend to be ineffectual, with very low matching rates. For
example, approximately 8,500 adoptees, birth parents, and siblings
registered in Texas by 2008, but the Texas registry made just one or
two matches of any family members each month.145 Almost 24,000
adoptees, 5,700 birth parents, and 1,100 siblings registered in New
York by 2009, but the New York registry made just 100 to 200
matches of any family members a year.146
Confidential intermediary registries, which at least twenty
states have enacted in some form, allow one sibling to initiate the
connection process. When a person joins one of these registries seeking
contact information about a sibling, the registry uses a confidential
intermediary to search for the sibling, ask her if she would like to

143. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-31(d)(9) (LexisNexis 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a746(a)(6) (West 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.27(3)(d) (West 2002).
144. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-503 to 9-9-504 (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.165 (West 2005);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-259A (2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144.43A (West 2005); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 199.575 (LexisNexis 2007); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1270 (Supp. 2012); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 2706-A (2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.121(9) (West Supp. 2012); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 127.007 (LexisNexis 2010); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4138-c to 4138-d (McKinney Supp.
2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.40 to 3107.41, 3107.48 to 3107.49 (LexisNexis 2008); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 15-7.2-6 to 15-7.2-10 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-780(E) (2010); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 162.414, 162.416 (West 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-144 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 6-105 (2010).
145. See Wendy Koch, As Adoptees Seek Roots, States Unsealing Records: Maine Lawmakers’
Story Shows 2 Sides of Debate, USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 2008, at 1A.
146. See Akiko Matsuda, Woman Seeking Adopted Half-Sister: Teacher Hopes Registry
Inquiry Leads to Long-Sought Reunion, J. NEWS (Lower Hudson Valley), Jan. 25, 2009, at 1B.
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connect, and distribute contact information if the sibling agrees.147
Unsurprisingly, these more active registries appear to be more
effective in matching willing siblings than registries that wait
passively for mutual consent. A study of the Georgia Adoption
Reunion Registry for adoptees, birth parents, and siblings tracked the
eighty searches that the registry both initiated and concluded during
the one-year period from October 1, 1998, to September 30, 1999.
Seventy-six percent of these searches led to a reunion, fifteen percent
led to the discovery that the searched-for family member had died,
and five percent ended with the searched-for family member denying
consent to be contacted. Only three searches ended with the registry
unable to locate the searched-for family member.148
Beyond sibling registries, legislators could think about
establishing default rules that promote the distribution of information
rather than relying on siblings to know to ask for it. For example,
states could create a default rule providing that when a group of
siblings separated by adoption all reach the age of majority, the state
will send each sibling basic, nonidentifying information about the
other siblings. Siblings could contact the state in advance if they
wanted to opt out of receiving any information and of having their
information distributed. When siblings did not opt out, the notification
would alert siblings to each other’s existence and ask them if they are
interested in sharing their identifying information and in receiving
their siblings’ identifying information. Such a regime would represent
more active state intervention to foster sibling relationships among
adults without any initial prompting by one of the siblings. But it
would enable siblings whose information the state has collected at the
time of an adoption to find one another in adulthood even if no sibling
is aware of the sibling registry or knows that he has biological
brothers or sisters.

147. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-134(A)(7) (Supp. 2011); CAL. FAM. CODE § 9205(g) (West
Supp. 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-304(1)(b)(I)(C) (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a743(3)(C), 45a-751(a) (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 962(a)(3) (2009); GA. CODE ANN. §
19-8-23(f)(5) (Supp. 2011); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/18.3a(a)–(b), (i) (West Supp. 2011); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-19-24-2 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-4B-05
(LexisNexis Supp. 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.68b (West 2002); MINN. STAT. §
259.83(1) (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-103(11), 42-6-103 to 42-6-104 (2011); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 32A-5-41 (West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-9-104 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16
(2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7508-1.3 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 109.502 to
109.504 (West 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-128 to 36-1-131 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.33.343 (West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-22-203 (2011).
148. See Robert L. Fischer, The Emerging Role of Adoption Reunion Registries: Adoptee and
Birthparent Views, 81 CHILD WELFARE 445, 453–54 (2002).
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States systematically focused on sibling relationships could
also think about whether their registries will be open to siblings
separated by adoption regardless of whether the siblings’ biological
parents agree. Some state sibling registries currently give biological
parents substantial control over the access that siblings have to each
other. Minnesota’s confidential intermediary system specifies that the
state “shall provide services to adult genetic siblings” only “if there is
no known violation of the confidentiality of a birth parent or if the
birth parent gives written consent.”149 Oregon law states that “[a]n
adult adoptee or the adoptive parent of a minor or deceased adoptee
may not request a search for a genetic sibling of the adoptee if there
was a previous search for a birth parent of the adoptee and the birth
parent did not want to make contact with the adult adoptee or
adoptive parent.”150 Nevada’s passive mutual consent registry
provides that if two siblings separated by adoption join the registry
and consent to share contact information with each other, the state
may distribute the information only if “written consent for the release
of such information is given by the natural parent.”151
With little apparent discussion or debate, such laws prioritize
continued parental prerogatives over biological children, including
adopted away children, and represent another example of how family
law views children through the lens of their relationships with their
parents. However, this focus on parental prerogatives comes at the
cost of denying some siblings separated by adoption the opportunity to
connect when each sibling would like to do so. Siblings rarely have any
role in the decision to separate them through adoption, and laws
granting parents significant power over sibling registries make it
more difficult for siblings to exercise control over whether they reunite
after adoption.
Third, the federal government could enact legislation that
would coordinate all state sibling registries into a combined database
in order to help people who do not know which state’s registry might
have information about them and/or their siblings. The Senate passed
a bill in 1997 to create “a National Voluntary Mutual Reunion
Registry,”152 but the bill died in the House of Representatives after a
subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee held a

149. MINN. STAT. § 259.83(1).
150. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.504(1).
151. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.007(3) (LexisNexis 2010); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
8-134(F); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-751b(e) (West Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
7508-1.3(D).
152. S. 1487, 105th Cong. (1997).
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hearing on the measure.153 Some congresspeople objected to the
proposed federal registry on the ground that “family law is best left to
the States.”154 However, evaluating the proposed federal registry on its
own merits, without canonical assumptions that family law should or
must be local,155 reveals a strong case for federal participation. A
federal database combining state registries would provide crucial
coordination to enable states to better effectuate their preexisting
policies, coordination that states have been unable to arrange on their
own. Some congresspeople criticizing the proposed federal registry
also cited privacy concerns.156 But both passive and confidential
intermediary state registries appear to have dealt successfully with
privacy concerns by requiring mutual consent before a registry shares
contact information, suggesting that a federal registry combining state
registries would be able to respect privacy as well.157
Let’s turn to siblings separated by divorce, the end of their
parent’s nonmarital relationship, or a common parent’s death. State
legislators and courts have canonically understood these events as
transformative moments in marital and parental relationships. Yet as
we have seen, these events may also profoundly transform sibling
relationships.
The appropriate legal treatment of split custody requires much
more sustained discussion and debate. At present, the law on split
custody varies widely and haphazardly between states and from case
to case. Some states have no presumption at all against split custody,
while other states impose at least nominally exacting standards
disfavoring the separation of siblings. Some judicial decisions
rigorously oppose split custody, while other decisions interpret
seemingly strict presumptions against separating siblings much more
loosely. Split custody can give parents an additional way to share the
benefits and burdens of childrearing, but this custody arrangement
can come at a tremendous cost to sibling relationships. States need to
153. For the hearing, see Adoption Reunion Registries and Screening of Adults Working with
Children: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
105th Cong. (1998).
154. Id. at 36 (statement of Rep. Tom Bliley); see also id. at 40–41 (statement of Sen. Robert
Bennett).
155. For criticism of such localist assumptions, see Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family
Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 870–92 (2004); Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family
Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998).
156. See Adoption Reunion Registries and Screening of Adults Working with Children:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, supra note
153, at 36 (statement of Rep. Tom Bliley); id. at 40–41, 43 (statement of Sen. Robert Bennett); id.
at 45 (statement of Rep. Jim McCrery).
157. See id. at 30, 41–42, 48–49 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
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think more rigorously about how to regulate split custody, considering
both the range of alternatives that states have already adopted and
additional possibilities that would be more protective of sibling ties.
For instance, a significantly more protective possibility would be for
state legislation to require a parent seeking to split custody of siblings
at divorce or the end of a nonmarital relationship to present a court
with clear and convincing evidence that placing siblings together
would be contrary to the best interests of at least one of the children.
Similarly, state law could require courts ordering split custody over a
parent’s objection to explain why there is clear and convincing
evidence that placing siblings together would be contrary to at least
one child’s best interests. Even if states decide that such a standard is
unduly hostile to split custody and adopt a less strict presumption
against split custody, or no presumption at all, state legislatures and
courts could focus much more systematically on how to assess and
safeguard a child’s interests when split custody is at issue. For
instance, states could usefully focus on how much, if any, weight
courts should give to a child’s own views about splitting the custody of
siblings. Similarly, state legislators could think about instructing
judges to be particularly wary of splitting custody along sex-based
lines because of the danger that such splits may reinforce gendered
understandings about children’s interests and about which children
are most valuable to whom.
Another issue that states can explore in focusing on split
custody concerns whether to apply the same presumptions against
separation to full siblings and half-siblings. A strict presumption
against separating half-siblings favors the custody claims of the halfsiblings’ common parent and disfavors custody claims from a parent
related to only one half-sibling. Some lawmakers and commentators
concerned about fairness between parents may accordingly be
unwilling to implement a presumption against separating halfsiblings. However, others may conclude that it is reasonable to
subordinate fairness between parents to the promotion of sibling
relationships by applying the same presumptions against split custody
to half-siblings. The argument in favor of this latter view is that halfsibling relationships can be as close and valuable as relationships
between full siblings, especially if half-siblings have the opportunity to
grow up together. Family law typically prioritizes parental
relationships over sibling ties with little deliberation. Yet children are
systematically more vulnerable than adults, and they commonly have
fewer material and psychological resources available to them in
maintaining relationships with family members living in other
households.
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A subsidiary issue for states to consider involves splitting
custody of half-siblings when that is necessary to keep each halfsibling with at least one parent. For instance, suppose a man and
woman, both with children from previous marriages, marry each
other, have children together, and then divorce. Unless the children
from this most recent marriage can evenly rotate between their
parents’ custody, which may be impossible for children attending
school, at least some half-siblings will need to live apart if every child
is to reside with one parent. Or suppose half-siblings are living with
their common parent and their common parent dies. Some might
argue that the law should keep half-siblings together in this situation,
even though that means some children will be living separately from
any parent. The contrary view, however, is that such a policy would
inappropriately discount the parent-child relationship.
Lastly, states should consider whether full or half-siblings
separated by divorce, the end of a nonmarital relationship, or a
parent’s death will have an enforceable right to contact,
communication, and visitation, unless a court determines that such
connection would be contrary to the best interests of one or more
siblings. Such a right would protect and promote sibling relationships,
albeit at the cost of some infringement on parental prerogatives. In
light of the constitutional constraints that Troxel appears to impose,
states that decide to create such an enforceable right to sibling
visitation might specify that courts will give “material weight” or more
to a parent’s assessment of her child’s best interests.158
CONCLUSION
Family law’s tight focus on marriage and parenthood has
directed legal decisionmakers and commentators away from exploring
how the law should safeguard and promote other familial ties. Yet
marriage and parenthood are not the only family connections that can
be central to family life and to the flourishing of family members,
providing care, love, support, and nurture. Examining the law’s
treatment of noncanonical family relationships brings a wealth of
potential reforms into view.
The reform possibilities that this Essay has considered suggest
just some of the myriad policy choices that emerge when we free
ourselves from the reflexive assumption that family law should be

158. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000) (plurality opinion). For an example of a postTroxel opinion along these lines, see Lindsie D.L. v. Richard W.S., 591 S.E.2d 308, 314 (W. Va.
2003).
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systematically concerned with only two family ties. These possibilities,
and many others involving both siblings and other noncanonical
relatives, need to be discussed and debated by legislators, regulators,
judges, scholars, advocates, and citizens who have so far given only
sporadic and uneven attention to family relationships beyond
marriage and parenthood. Family law’s narrow focus on marriage and
parenthood, inherited from the common law and then endlessly
replicated without normative scrutiny, has constrained critical
thinking in family law for too long.

